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I defend the view that a reason for someone to do something is just a reason why
she ought to do it. This simple view has been thought incompatible with the
existence of reasons to do things that we may refrain from doing or even ought
not to do. For it is widely assumed that there are reasons why we ought to do
something only if we ought to do it. I present several counterexamples to this
principle and reject some ways of understanding ought so that the principle is
compatible with my examples. I conclude with a hypothesis for when and why
the principle should be expected to fail.
This paper is about reasons. Many philosophers believe that there are
at least three kinds of reasons, or senses of the count-noun reason.
Consider the following examples:
(1) The reason why the town was abandoned was that zombies
attacked.
(2) That the zombies attacked was a reason to abandon town.
(3) The reason for which they abandoned town was that zombies
attacked.
The type of reason in (1) is usually called explanatory. The type in (2)
is usually called normative. And the type in (3) is usually called moti-
vating. My focus is on explanatory and normative reasons; I shall not
discuss motivating reasons.
My view is that normative reasons are just explanatory reasons of a
particular kind. More specifically, a reason for someone to do some-
thing is just a reason why she ought to do it.
The paper comes in four sections. In §1, I introduce the view that
normative reasons are a kind of explanatory reason. In §2, I introduce
the main problem with this view: it is thought to be incompatible with
the existence of reasons to do things that we may refrain from doing
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or even ought not to do. Many people assume that there are reasons
why we ought to do something only if we ought to do it. I present
some counterexamples to this principle. In §3, I consider ways of
understanding ought so that the principle is compatible with my ex-
amples. In §4, I present a hypothesis for when the principle should be
expected to fail—namely, when ought is multidimensional, in a sense
to be explained.
1. Normative reasons
Many philosophers take the concept of a normative reason—or of the
counting-in-favour-of relation that holds between normative reasons
and the acts or attitudes they support—as primitive. They are reasons
primitivists. Many of these reasons primitivists hope to understand all
normative concepts—for example, the concepts good, right, justified,
and ought—in terms of the concept of a normative reason (see Dancy
2004; Skorupski 2010; Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014). Parfit, for example,
believes that S ought to f means that S’s reasons to f are stronger than
S’s reasons to do otherwise (p. 33).
Opponents of reasons primitivism believe that the concept of a
normative reason can be analysed in other terms (whether normative
or non-normative). But it seems that no proposed analysis has been
successful.
Kearns and Star (2008), for example, propose that a reason to f is
just evidence that one ought to f. Intuitively, however, many pieces of
evidence that one ought to f are not reasons to f. That some reliable
book says I ought to exercise (with no explanation) is not, many
people believe, a reason for me to exercise, although it may be good
evidence that I ought to exercise (Broome 2013).
The reasons to exercise must, according to Broome, play a role in
explaining why I ought to exercise (see also Toulmin 1950; Finlay 2001).1
Broome holds that all reasons are explanatory. There I agree with him.
But what is their explanatory role?
Broome claims that, in one sense, a reason for someone to f is a
fact that explains why she ought to f. He calls these pro toto reasons. If
there is a pro toto reason for S to f, then S ought to f. For if p explains
1 On other views, the reasons to exercise must play a certain role in explaining why it
would be good to exercise (Raz 1999; Finlay 2014; Wedgwood 2015; Maguire 2016), or why there
is reason (mass-noun) to exercise (Fogal 2016; Fogal and Sylvan 2017). I set aside these alter-
natives here.
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why q, then q must be true. But not all normative reasons are pro toto
reasons. There are normative reasons to do things that one may refrain
from doing, and normative reasons to do things that one ought not to
do. We have pro tanto reasons, which need not be decisive (in the sense
of implying that we ought to do what they count in favour of doing). For
example, that I am hungry may be a reason for me to steal a person’s
food, but I ought not to steal a person’s food. That reason is not decisive.
On Broome’s view, a pro tanto reason for S to f is explanatory, but
it is not an explanation of why S ought to f. He suggests that pro tanto
reasons for S to f do not quite explain why S ought to f, but rather
play a certain role in a certain kind of explanation of why it is or is not
the case that S ought to f, whatever the case may be. The certain kind
of explanation is a weighing explanation: one ought to f because the
reasons for fing outweigh the reasons against fing. Broome then
understands the counting-in-favour-of relation in terms of the for-
fing role in an explanation of that kind. That is, when one ought to f,
the facts that count in favour of fing are just the facts that win out in
the weighing explanation.2
Broome’s account of pro tanto reasons strikes some philosophers as
ad hoc or unilluminating. For one thing, our grip on which facts play
which roles in explaining whether we ought to f seems parasitic on
our more basic understanding of which facts count in favour of fing
(Schroeder 2007; Kearns and Star 2008; Brunero 2013). So Broome’s
account of pro tanto reasons in terms of weighing explanations seems
not to provide a non-circular, informative account of what it is for
some fact to count in favour of, or be a reason for, fing. Moreover, it
is not obvious that normative reasons must participate in weighing
explanations: reasons might not add up or interact in the way that
weights add up and interact; weakening the metaphor of weighing to
allow for such possibilities makes it less clear what weighing explan-
ations are supposed to be (Hawthorne and Magidor forthcoming).
2 Maguire (2018) emphasizes the features of normative reasons mentioned in the previous
two paragraphs, namely, that reasons need not be decisive, and that they play a certain role in
weighing explanations. He argues that these features (and another: gradable weights) are lacked
by the kinds of considerations that support affective attitudes, and that we therefore have no
reasons to have such attitudes. This conclusion may be in tension with my analysis of nor-
mative reasons. For we sometimes ought to have such attitudes, and presumably, when that is
so, there are reasons why we ought to have such attitudes. So there can, on my analysis, be
reasons for us to have those attitudes. I must therefore either reject Maguire’s claim that
reasons must have the features in question, or insist that the kinds of considerations that
support affective attitudes have those features. I am currently inclined to prefer the first
strategy.
Mind, Vol. 128 . 510 . April 2019  Nebel 2018
Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought 461
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
ind/article-abstract/128/510/459/5053603 by guest on 23 M
ay 2019
What I find most unattractive about Broome’s view is that he posits
two normative senses of the count-noun reason: pro toto and pro tanto
senses. This move, it seems to me, multiplies senses beyond necessity
and lacks a basis in either our ordinary or distinctively philosophical
uses of the word. The main advantage of Broome’s view is, I believe,
its unification of normative and explanatory reasons. But this unifi-
cation comes at the cost of an objectionably disjunctive account of
normative reasons (Schroeder 2007; Kearns and Star 2008). This cost
does not seem to me worth paying.
There is, however, a simpler account that captures the unifying
advantage of Broome’s view while avoiding its costs. On this account,
a (normative) reason for S to f is just an (explanatory) reason why S
ought to f. That is the view I shall defend.
2. Factivity
The view that reasons to f are reasons why we ought to f seems to
face the same problem that led Broome to distinguish pro tanto from
pro toto reasons. The problem is that we can have reasons to do things
that we may refrain from doing or even ought not to do. But if a
reason to f is a reason why one ought to f, then the existence of
reasons to f might seem to require that one ought to f. So my view
might seem to rule out the possibility of non-decisive reasons.
The key assumption that generates this problem is:
Factivity: For any p, there is a reason why p only if p is true.
If Factivity is correct, and if reasons to f are reasons why one ought to
f, then there are reasons to f only if one ought to f. That would rule
out the existence of reasons to do things that we may refrain from
doing or even ought not to do.
Factivity is assumed implicitly by Schroeder (2007, p. 35), Broome
(2013, p. 50), and Skow (2016, p. 38), and explicitly by Lawler (1971, p.
167), Dancy (2000, p. 132), Grice (2001, p. 31), Finlay (2014, p. 109),
and Hawthorne and Magidor (forthcoming). I know of only one phil-
osopher who seems to reject it (see Wilson 1979, p. 273, although
his non-factive usage may be merely stipulative).
I believe that Factivity is false. Just as we can have reasons to f and
reasons not to f, there can be reasons why we ought to f and reasons
why we ought not to f. But it cannot, I assume, be true both that we
ought to f and that we ought not to f. (In the next section, I consider
ways in which this assumption might be rejected.)
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Consider the following example from Abraham Lincoln, regarding
the proposed release of Confederate diplomats Jason Mason and John
Slidell:
(4) Governor Seward, you will go on, of course, preparing your
answer, which, as I understand, will state the reasons why they
ought to be given up. Now I have a mind to try my hand at
stating the reasons why they ought not to be given up.
(Burlingame 2013, p. 227)
Lincoln thought that there were reasons why Mason and Slidell ought
to be given up and reasons why they ought not to be given up.3 But
surely he didn’t think both that they ought to be given up and that
they ought not to be given up.
Similar examples arise for other modals:
(5) [T]here exist good reasons why consent should be granted and
good reasons why consent should be withheld […]. (In re
Cotton 1994, p. 185)
(6) Thus, subjects who were able to think of many reasons why an
event would happen, and few reasons why it would not, judged
that event to be likely. (MacLeod 1994, p. 119)
(7) There are many reasons why a free offer will work and reasons
why it won’t. (Carpenter 2015)
(8) This article presents four reasons why [Argentina] can [beat
Uruguay], and four reasons why they can’t. (Traquette 2011)
(9) [C]an a lightsaber cut through Superman? We […] came up
with reasons why it could and reasons why it couldn’t. (Chen
2008)
These examples state that there are reasons why some p should, would,
can, could, or ought to be the case and also reasons why that p should
not, would not, cannot, could not, or ought not to be the case. But
surely they do not presuppose both of these claims.
Examples like (4)–(9) are my main reasons for rejecting Factivity.
But let me mention another reason to be suspicious of this principle. If
reason why p were factive with respect to p, then we might expect it to
remain factive when negated. Karttunen (1971) observes that, except in
3 At least, he thought this at the time. The next day, Lincoln told Seward that he couldn’t
develop a satisfying argument for retaining Mason and Slidell.
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very special circumstances, negations of factive verbs presuppose the
truth of their complements:
(10) John didn’t [regret/forget/like] that he had not told the truth.
(Karttunen 1971, p. 63)
This presupposes that John had not told the truth.4 But consider:
(11) That one is hungry is not a reason why one should steal
another’s food.
This does not presuppose that one should steal another’s food. One
could felicitously follow up (11) with something like ‘One shouldn’t
steal another’s food even if one is hungry ’. By contrast, when the why-
clause contains no modal verb, both is a reason why p and is [no/not a]
reason why p seem factive with respect to p:
(12) #There’s a reason why John didn’t tell the truth. [And/but]
John did tell the truth.
(13) #That he was nervous isn’t a reason why John didn’t tell the
truth. [And/but] John did tell the truth.
Those sound bad. When the why-clause contains no modal verb,
reason why appears to work like more familiar factive constructions.
We should therefore expect that if the construction remained factive
when the why-clause contains a modal verb, then (11) would presup-
pose that one should steal another’s food. But it doesn’t.
The factivity of reason why might be thought to follow from the
semantics of why-questions. It is natural to think that a reason why p
is an answer to the question ‘Why p?’ (Hieronymi 2011; Skow 2016).
And many philosophers and linguists claim that questions of the form
‘Why p?’ presuppose that p (Kim 1964; Bromberger 1966; Lawler 1971;
Sober 1986; Temple 1988; Pietroski 2002; Fitzpatrick 2005; Brandtler
2008; Tomioka 2009). For example:
(14) Why didn’t John tell the truth?
This question presupposes that John did not tell the truth. But, again,
things seem different in the presence of modals:
(15) Why wouldn’t John tell the truth?
4 An anonymous referee points out that some utterances of (10) do not seem to carry this
presupposition. Karttunen himself notes that one might utter a version of (10) with an em-
phasis on didn’t to emphatically deny a previous assertion that carries the presupposition. But
such cancelling contexts are very much the exception; in general, negative assertions involving
factive verbs presuppose the truth of their complements.
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(16) Why shouldn’t John tell the truth?
These questions do not presuppose that John wouldn’t or shouldn’t
tell the truth (as Kim 1964, p. 363, acknowledges). So even if reasons
why p are answers to the question, ‘Why p?’, neither the answers nor
the questions presuppose p in certain cases.
The examples I have discussed so far use the plural reasons why and
the indefinite singular a reason why. But the definite singular the
reason why seems to work differently:
(17) That one is hungry is not the reason why one should steal
another’s food.
This sentence seems to presuppose that one should steal another’s
food. If the reason why p is factive with respect to p, this may pose
a problem for my view. For suppose that r is a reason why p, and that
there are no other reasons why p. Then r is the reason why p. But it
would be strange if the existence of a reason why p and the existence of
no other reasons why p were enough to secure that p, when the ex-
istence of additional reasons why p would be compatible with p’s
falsity. The apparent factivity of the reason why might therefore lead
one to accept the factivity of reason why more generally.
However, the apparent factivity of the reason why seems to me a
pragmatic feature of the definite singular, not a semantic feature of
reason why more generally. For one thing, the presupposition can be
cancelled by various modifiers:
(18) The only/best reason why one should steal another’s food is that
one is hungry. But that’s not a good enough reason. One should
never steal another’s food!
This suggests that even though the reason why p may normally convey
that p, this is not because the existence of a unique reason why p more
generally presupposes that p. Moreover, the presupposition seems
absent when the definite article modifies a plural noun:
(19) The reasons why one should steal another’s food are silly.
This sentence seems not to presuppose that one should steal another’s
food. Indeed, one might assert (19) in an attempt to argue that one
shouldn’t steal another’s food. I, therefore, doubt that the usual com-
mitments of the reason why are due to the factivity of reason why more
generally.
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Moreover, the definite singular seems to carry different commit-
ments for talk of normative reasons as well:
(20) That one is hungry is not the reason to steal another’s food.
Sentence (20) seems to presuppose that one ought to steal another’s
food. But the presupposition is cancelled or entirely absent in other
cases:
(21) That one is hungry is not a reason to steal another’s food.
(22) The only reason to steal another’s food is that one is hungry.
(23) The reasons to steal another’s food are silly.
(24) The best reason to steal another’s food is that one is hungry.
One can assert (21)–(24) in the course of denying that one should steal
another’s food. The same pattern seems to hold for both explanatory
and normative reasons. This suggests that the apparent factivity of the
reason why is not a problem for my analysis of normative reasons as
explanatory reasons.
I have suggested that reason why p is not always factive with respect
to p. So there can be reasons why one ought to f even if it’s not the
case that one ought to f. This means that my simple account of
normative reasons is compatible with the existence of reasons to do
things that we may refrain from doing or even ought not to do. There
is no need to distinguish between pro tanto and pro toto reasons. All
normative reasons are explanatory reasons of the same kind.
3. Alternative oughts
In §2, I denied that reason why p is factive with respect to p. My main
reasons for denying factivity were examples (4)–(9), which say that
there are reasons why some p should, would, could, can, will, or ought
to be the case, and reasons why p should not, would not, could not,
cannot, will not, or ought not to be the case. In this section, I consider
alternative explanations of this data.
After presenting examples (4)–(9), I said that although there are
reasons why we ought to f and reasons why we ought not to f, surely
it’s not the case that we both ought and ought not to f. Abraham
Lincoln, for example, was not presupposing both that Mason and
Slidell ought to and ought not to be released. Some philosophers,
though, might deny this.
This strategy could be pursued in at least two ways. One way would
read the oughts in question as somehow attenuated in strength. The
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other way would differentiate between the modal parameters or fla-
vours of the oughts in question, in a sense that I shall explain. But let
me start with the strategy of attenuation.5
3.1 Attenuation
I have been assuming that the oughts in question are all things con-
sidered oughts. This may be the sense that reasons primitivists analyse
in terms of normative reasons: we ought to f (in this all-things-con-
sidered sense) if and only if we have most reason to f. We cannot have
most reason to f and most reason not to f. In this sense of ought,
it cannot be the case both that we ought to f and that we ought not
to f.
Some philosophers countenance a pro tanto sense of ought. This
sense could be understood in various ways. According to Crisp
(2015, p. 153), you pro tanto ought to f just in case, to some extent,
you ought to f. According to Reisner (2013), you pro tanto ought to f
just in case, if there were no other relevant considerations, you ought
to f. On these weaker readings, the existence of reasons why we ought
to f and reasons why we ought not to f is compatible with Factivity,
so long as these oughts are merely pro tanto.
I am not convinced that this is a bona fide sense of ought. If it were,
then we might expect these readings to be eligible without explicitly
qualifying the ought with phrases like to some extent or if there were no
other relevant considerations. But these reading do not seem eligible
without explicit qualification. For example, if someone would enjoy
torturing puppies, she might have some reason to do so. And perhaps
if all other things were equal—that is, if there were no other relevant
considerations in favour or against torturing puppies—it would be
true that she ought to torture puppies. But there seems to be no
sense of ought in which she ought indeed to torture puppies. When
a philosopher says that someone pro tanto ought to do something, this
seems to me a technical way of saying that she has some reason to do
something, or that it would be the case that she ought to do it if other
5 One response that I do not consider here is that my examples involve genuine deontic
dilemmas in which, all things considered, we both ought to and ought not to f. As an
anonymous reviewer suggests, that is implausible because even if such dilemmas are possible
(see, for example, van Fraassen 1973; Horty 2003; Horty 2012, ch. 4), we should expect them to
be rare; the mere existence of reasons to and reasons not to should not generate tragic
dilemmas (although see Sachs 2015). Moreover, in order to address all of (4)–(9), there
would have to be not just deontic dilemmas (involving deontic oughts and shoulds), but
also genuine dilemmas of other modal flavours involving conflicting wills, woulds, cans, and
coulds. That sort of view has no precedent, as far as I am aware.
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things were equal. It does not clarify an independently existing
sense of ought that speakers like Lincoln would use in statements
like (4).
It might be thought that statements of Rossian (1930) duties like
‘We ought to keep our promises’ use ought in a pro tanto sense. After
all, we cannot conclude from the fact that we ought to keep our
promises and that S promised to f that S ought to f all things con-
sidered. But it is more plausible that ought has its ordinary sense
throughout, and that what ought to be the case—that is, that we
keep our promises—is a generic, rather than universal, generalization.
Because it is generic, it does not entail that whenever someone prom-
ises to do something, she ought to do it. We do not need a pro tanto
sense of ought to account for Rossian duties, because genericity is
sufficient to distinguish them from absolute requirements.
Moreover, even if there is a pro tanto sense of ought, appealing to
such a sense might be a merely partial solution, for two reasons. First,
it is doubtful that there are pro tanto senses of could, can, will, and
would. And without such senses, the view cannot account for examples
(6)–(9). Second, there may be cases in which one says that there are
reasons why some p ought to be the case all things considered and
reasons why that p ought not to be the case all things considered.
Consider Lincoln’s (4). Plausibly, Seward was giving reasons why, all
things considered, Mason and Slidell ought to be given up, and
Lincoln was intending to give reasons why, all things considered,
Mason and Slidell ought not to be given up. Appealing to an attenu-
ated sense of ought does not save Factivity if one can assert the exist-
ence of reasons why, all things considered, we ought to f, and reasons
why, all things considered, we ought not to f.
3.2 Differentiation
Appealing to attenuated oughts is one way of maintaining that the
oughts in question are compatible. Another way is to distinguish be-
tween the modal parameters or flavours of the oughts in question, in a
sense that I shall now explain.
The conventional wisdom in linguistics maintains that sentences
containing ought, should, and other modals express different propos-
itions depending on contextually relevant background conditions and
standards. According to Kratzer (1977)’s influential version of this
view, they quantify over possible worlds. The context supplies a way
of restricting the set of possible worlds to a relevant domain, which
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forms the modal base. For example, suppose that a hurricane has just
passed, and someone says:
(25) The bridge ought to have collapsed.
The modal base here might only include worlds in which, among
other things, the hurricane occurs. But what has to be true of the
worlds in the modal base for (25) to come out true?
On the orthodox view, ought is treated as a universal quantifier. But
of course not all worlds in the modal base are worlds in which the
bridge collapses: one might assert (25) after watching the bridge with-
stand the hurricane. Kratzer’s proposal is that we somehow rank the
worlds, and that (25) is true just in case the bridge collapses in all the
top-ranked worlds. The mode of ranking worlds is the ordering source,
which (for Kratzer) consists of a set of propositions. For deontic
modals, the ordering source might be a set of laws or moral require-
ments. For epistemic modals, it might be a set of propositions that are
normal, stereotypical, probable, or otherwise reasonable to expect. We
rank worlds by their closeness to the ideal—that is, satisfaction of all
propositions in the ordering source. For example, (25) is true just in
case the bridge collapses in all the most normal worlds in the modal
base.
Many aspects of Kratzer’s semantics are controversial. But the core
features of the account that are relevant for our purposes are shared by
most of the alternatives that have been proposed. For example, one
radical departure from Kratzer’s semantics holds that modals do not
quantify over possible worlds, but should instead be understood on
the model of gradable adjectives (Lassiter 2011). This view starts from
probabilities and degrees of obligation or desirability, and understands
ought in terms of these scalar notions. Other views add additional
ordering sources for ought, hold that ought requires the relevant prop-
osition to hold only in most of the best worlds, allow the ordering
source to vary with the agent’s or speaker’s evidence, replace propos-
itions with event-descriptions or actions, or rank options (understood
as sets of worlds) rather than worlds (see Von Fintel and Iatridou
2005; Chrisman 2012; Silk 2013; Cariani 2011). These departures from
the orthodox view are, I think, harmless for our purposes. We can use
Kratzer’s semantics in the interest of simplicity, as long as what we
ought to do is a function of some ranking of some contextually rele-
vant items according to relevant standards.
Does this view help to maintain Factivity in light of statements like
(4)–(9)? This depends on how plausible it is that, when one asserts the
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existence of reasons why one ought to f and reasons why one ought
not to f, the oughts in question do not share the same modal base and
ordering source. If the modal base or ordering source differs between
the oughts, then it may be true (given one modal base and ordering
source) that we ought to f and true (given another modal base or
ordering source) that we ought not to f.
A shift in modal base may be plausible in some cases. Recall (6):
Thus, subjects who were able to think of many reasons why an event
would happen, and few reasons why it would not, judged that event to be
likely.
It may be tempting to think that each would holds fixed different
circumstances (although I question this later). Given some circum-
stances, the event would happen. Given other circumstances, the event
would not happen. So the woulds may both be true. Similar stories
may apply to (7) and (8)—which use will and can, respectively—al-
though I won’t spell them out.
A shift in modal base is less plausible for certain cases involving
deontic modals:
(26) So far you’ve given two reasons why Kelly should bring
Evelyn’s picture out of the rain and one reason why she should
leave it there. The two reasons why Kelly should bring Evelyn’s
picture out of the rain are that Kelly shouldn’t be selfish and
that it’s a shame to let a beautiful picture be ruined. The
reason why Kelly should leave it there is that Evelyn needs to
learn to be more responsible. (Waggoner et al. 1995, p. 585)
It is hard to see what the difference between the modal bases would be
in (26). Perhaps one modal base includes that Kelly shouldn’t be
selfish and that it’s a shame to let a beautiful picture be ruined,
whereas the other includes that Evelyn needs to learn to be more
responsible. But it seems possible that both shoulds hold fixed all
these facts: there may be reasons why, even though Evelyn needs to
learn to be more responsible, Kelly should bring Evelyn’s picture out
of the rain, and reasons why, even though Kelly shouldn’t be selfish
and it’s a shame to let a beautiful picture be ruined, Kelly should leave
Evelyn’s picture out in the rain.
In (26), a shift in ordering source seems to me more plausible than a
shift in modal base. That Kelly shouldn’t be selfish and that it’s a
shame to ruin a beautiful picture may explain why, ordering alterna-
tives in some way that gives pride of place to Kelly ’s character or the
appreciation of beauty, it is best to bring the picture out of the rain.
Mind, Vol. 128 . 510 . April 2019  Nebel 2018
470 Jacob M. Nebel
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
ind/article-abstract/128/510/459/5053603 by guest on 23 M
ay 2019
The need to teach Evelyn a lesson may explain why, ordering alterna-
tives in some way that gives pride of place to Evelyn’s character, it is
best to leave the picture out in the rain. On this view, the shoulds are
interpreted relative to the same set of possible worlds, but these worlds
are ordered according to different standards.
It is not clear what features of the sentences are supposed to cause
the shifts in modal base or ordering source. Most of the examples state
that there are reasons why p should, can, will, would, or ought to be
the case and reasons why p should, can, will, would, or ought not to be
the case, without stating what those reasons are. What features of the
sentences would make one modal base or ordering source salient for
one use of the clause but not for the other?
In other cases where a shift in modal base or ordering source is
plausible, there is a good account of what causes that shift. For ex-
ample, consider the following argument:
(27) (P1) If you want to kill people for fun, you ought to kill them
with a chainsaw.6
(P2) You want to kill people for fun.
(C) So, you ought to kill people with a chainsaw.
The premises may be true, but the conclusion seems false. We seem
unable to detach the ought claim in the consequent of (P1). One
Kratzerian story about this kind of argument is that we interpret the
oughts relative to different ordering sources (Silk 2014, p. 9). For ex-
ample, in (P1) we might be ordering alternatives according to what
would best achieve your goals; this teleological ordering source may be
made salient by the want in the antecedent. In (C) we might be
ordering alternatives according to what would best conform to mor-
ality or some other set of norms; a deontic ordering source may be
made salient by mentioning such morally fraught things as guns. I do
not claim that this story is correct. My claim is that the plausibility of
this story depends on its account of what predicts the teleological
interpretation of the ought in (P1) and the deontic interpretation of
the ought in (C). Without this account, the story would not provide a
good explanation of the data.
Similarly, a proponent of the view under consideration—that when
there are reasons why we ought to f and reasons why we ought not to
6 There is a sizable literature on these so-called ‘anankistic conditionals’. See, for example,
Sæbø (2001); Von Fintel and Iatridou (2005); Huitink (2005); von Stechow, Krasikova, and
Penka (2006); Finlay (2014, ch. 3); Condoravdi and Lauer (2016); Finlay (2016).
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f, these oughts are interpreted relative to different modal bases or
ordering sources—owes us an account of what predicts this difference.
What makes one modal base or ordering source salient for one ought
but another modal base or ordering source salient for the other? In
(27), there are other expressions in the sentences that seem to make
one interpretation more salient than another. But there seem to be no
such expressions in the examples we are considering. Without an ac-
count of what causes the shift in ordering source or modal base in our
examples, the story provides a weak explanation of the data.7
One might reply as follows:
Saying that there are reasons why we ought to f makes salient some modal
base and ordering source relative to which fing is best, because it
presupposes that we ought to f; so we interpret the ought in such a way
that it comes out true. Similarly, saying that there are reasons why we
ought not to f makes salient some other modal base or ordering source
relative to which the speaker thinks not fing is best, because it presupposes
that we ought not to f.
But embedding oughts in factive environments does not generally lead
us to interpret them relative to different modal parameters. Consider:
(29) #Cat knows that we ought to f. Dana knows that we ought not
to f.
That sounds bad, to my ear. But, according to the view under con-
sideration, saying something that presupposes that we ought to f
makes salient some modal base and ordering source relative to
which fing is best, and then saying something that presupposes that
we ought not to f makes salient some other modal base or ordering
source relative to which not fing is best. So why don’t we shift the
modal base or ordering source accordingly for (29)? The first sentence
presupposes that we ought to f, and the second presupposes that we
7 But consider the following abomination uttered by Anakin Skywalker after his mother
dies in Attack of the Clones:
(28) But I couldn’t… . Why did she have to die? Why couldn’t I save her? I know I could
have.
One might claim that there must be a shift in the relevant modal base or ordering source,
because Anakin presupposes both that he could and that he couldn’t have saved his mother.
And yet nothing would signal which particular modal base or ordering source is relevant to
each sentence.
But I read (28) differently: it seems to me that Anakin changes his mind after the ellipses:
he starts to say that he couldn’t have saved her but then takes it back. This fact is obscured
either by Hayden Christensen’s acting or by George Lucas’s writing.
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ought not to f. But it is unnatural to read these oughts differently in
order to accept both presuppositions. The natural reading of (29)
interprets these oughts the same way. So it remains unclear what
would cause a shift in the modal base or ordering source in our
examples.
I do not deny that modals like ought are context-sensitive in the way
required by the strategy of differentiation. My claim is merely that the
appeal to context-sensitivity does not save the factivity of reason why
from the apparent counterexamples. Consider examples involving
other context-sensitive expressions:
(30) Cat looked outside and saw that it was raining.
(31) Dana looked outside and saw that it wasn’t raining.
Sentences (30) and (31) can both be true because it may have been
raining where Cat was and not raining where Dana was. But that
doesn’t make it felicitous to assert:
(32) #Cat saw that it was raining, and Dana saw that it wasn’t
raining.
We naturally consider the conjuncts according to a fixed contextual par-
ameter—for example, a single time and place (see Moss 2015, p. 49).8
Similarly, there may be cases in which it is felicitous to assert that one
ought to f and felicitous to assert that one ought not to f, because we
interpret these oughts relative to different contextual parameters, but this
doesn’t make it felicitous to assert that one ought to f and that one ought
not to f. And one would expect that if reason why p were factive with
respect to p, it would be infelicitous to assert that there are reasons why
one ought to f and reasons why one ought not to f; we would expect
these oughts to be interpreted according to the same contextual param-
eters, much as in (32).
I said earlier that an appeal to different modal bases might seem
plausible for some of my examples involving non-deontic modals. But,
for the reasons given above, I do not think this strategy of differenti-
ation can plausibly explain all the relevant data—for example, sen-
tences (26), (4), and (5). One possible reaction to this failure would be
to appeal to shifts in contextual parameters for some of the examples
8 (32) may have an acceptable reading in certain contexts—for example, if the speaker
wishes to draw attention, in a playful or paradoxical way, to the fact that Cat and Dana are
in different locations with different climates. But this rhetorical flourish seems to exploit the
fact that the point should, strictly speaking, be expressed with explicit reference to the different
locations. Similar remarks apply to (29).
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but not for the non-deontic examples. This would leave my main
claim—that there can be reasons why S ought to f even if it’s not
the case that S ought to f—intact. But other things being equal, a
uniform explanation of our data would be preferable. We do not need
to appeal to shifts in contextual parameters in order to explain any of
the data. We can simply deny that reason why is factive.
For example, my interpretation of (6)—‘Thus, subjects who
were able to think of many reasons why an event would happen, and
few reasons why it would not, judged that event to be likely ’—is that
both woulds share the same modal base: perhaps everything the relevant
subjects know, or some other salient body of information. Neither the
subjects nor the speaker is committed to thinking both that the event
would and that the event would not happen, given those fixed param-
eters, because there can be reasons why it would (or would not) happen
even if it’s not the case that it would (not) happen. My interpretation
seems preferable to the strategy of differentiation, on which the woulds
in (6) must be interpreted relative to different modal bases. For that
strategy may distort the meaning of the sentence. According to the
strategy of differentiation, (6) describes subjects who were able to
think of many reasons why, given some hypothetical constraints, an
event would occur, and few reasons why, given other hypothetical con-
straints, the event would not occur. But that does not seem quite right.
These subjects may very well have been able to concoct many reasons
why, given various possible constraints beyond their ken, the event
would not occur. They just could not think of many reasons why, in
light of the information available to them, it would not occur, while
being able to think of many reasons why, in light of that same body of
information, it would occur. (This interpretation is, at the very least, an
eligible reading, which suggests that a shift in modal base is not neces-
sary.) Positing a change in modal base without any strong indicator of
such a shift may therefore amount to changing the subject.
I have considered two ways of maintaining Factivity in light of
examples (4)–(9). Neither attenuation nor differentiation seems to
me successful. There are surely other ways of pursuing this strategy.
But, for reasons that will emerge in the next section, they are unlikely
to succeed if they are too specific to modals.
4. Multidimensionality
I have argued that there can be reasons why we ought to f even if it’s
not the case that we ought to f. In §3, I considered the view that if
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there are reasons why we ought to f and reasons why we ought not to
f, then indeed we ought to f and we ought not to f, but these oughts
are consistent, because they are somehow attenuated or differentiated.
I denied that these oughts should be understood as pro tanto or as
relative to different modal parameters.
Both views considered in §3 are specific to ought and other modals.
So these views fail to apply in (at least, prima facie) non-modal cases
like (33)–(36):
(33) There are doubtless more reasons why grad school is
worthwhile (and, assuredly, some reasons why it isn’t) […].
(Sharon 2013)
(34) As a result, seven reasons why being the first author is
important and six reasons why it is not were identified as
shown in Table 2. (Krasnova et al. 2012)
(35) For example, before leading a discussion on prohibition, assign
each student to write three reasons why prohibition is a good
idea and three reasons why prohibition is a bad idea. (Salsbury
2011)
(36) Identify reasons why competition is useful and why it is not
useful in terms of healthcare cost, quality, and access. (Rakich,
Longest, and Darr 2010, p. 4)
These sentences do not presuppose that grad school is both worth-
while and not worthwhile, that being the first author is both import-
ant and not important, that prohibition is both a good idea and a bad
idea, or that competition is both useful and not useful. The predicates
worthwhile, important, good, and useful are not being used in merely
pro tanto senses. Nor does it seem to me likely that each predicate
carries two different semantic values within each sentence.
I suggest that we try to understand what is going on in (33)–(36)
and then see if the explanation generalizes to the cases involving
modals.
One feature that examples (33)–(36) have in common is that worth-
while, important, good, and useful are gradable adjectives. Something
can be somewhat worthwhile, very important, extremely good, or
more or less useful. But, for some gradable adjectives F , we cannot
say that there are reasons why a thing is F and reasons why it isn’t F :
(37) ?There are reasons why John is tall and reasons why John isn’t
tall.
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(38) ?There are reasons why the table is long and reasons why the
table isn’t long.
(39) ?There are reasons why the box is heavy and reasons why the
box isn’t heavy.
These sentences seem unacceptable. This is because, in normal con-
texts, (37) presupposes that John is tall and that John isn’t tall, (38)
presupposes that the table is long and that it isn’t long, and (39)
presupposes that the box is heavy and that it isn’t heavy.9
Moreover, the adjectival nature of the predicates in (33)–(36) is ines-
sential. Consider the following examples:
(40) There are many reasons why auto racing is a sport, and many
reasons why it isn’t. (Sun 2010)
(41) [R]emember that Immanuel Kant offers theoretical reasons why
instrumental music is fine art, and then reasons why it is not
fine art. (Gracyk 2013, p. 61)
What (40) and (41) have in common with (33)–(36), which is not
shared by (37)–(39), is that the predicates are multidimensional.
There are multiple ways or respects in which a thing can be worth-
while, important, a sport, good, useful, or fine art. Something can be
one of these things in some respects but not in others. Not so for tall,
long, and heavy—at least, in normal contexts. (In some contexts, these
predicates can perhaps enjoy a kind of multidimensionality: for ex-
ample, if John has an extremely tall hairdo but is otherwise of average
height, or if a rhombus-shaped table has short sides but a long diag-
onal, or if a massive box is floating in a low-gravity environment.
(37)–(39) may be heard as acceptable in such contexts, precisely due
to their multidimensionality.) I conjecture that when F is a multidi-
mensional predicate, there can be reasons why a thing is F and reasons
why it isn’t F. This is not because the semantic value of F changes or
because F expresses only some degree of Fness, but rather because the
existence of such reasons requires only that the thing is F in some
respects but not in others. By contrast, when F is a one-dimensional
predicate, there cannot be reasons why a thing is F and reasons why
9 I admit that we can understand what a speaker is trying to say in uttering (37), (38), or
(39)—perhaps that there are reasons why some would count John as tall and why some
wouldn’t, or that there are reasons why the table would count as long in some contexts
and reasons why it wouldn’t count as long in others—but our ability to understand what a
speaker is trying to say in uttering a sentence is not dispositive of whether the sentence is
felicitous.
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it isn’t F , because such reasons would presuppose that it both is and
isn’t F .
Returning to the examples involving modals, I propose that we
generalize the diagnosis of multidimensionality. There can be reasons
why p should, can, would, could, or ought to be the case and reasons
why p shouldn’t, can’t, wouldn’t, couldn’t, or ought not to be the case
when and because these modal operators rank worlds along multiple
dimensions. Proximity to an ideal—whether deontic, teleological,
bouletic, stereotypical, or whatever—may depend on various factors.
There can be trade-offs between morally relevant considerations,
goals, desires, and standards of normalcy. Worlds can be close to
the contextually relevant ideal in some respects but not in others.
The hypothesis is that whenever there are reasons why p should,
can, would, could, or ought to be the case and reasons why p
shouldn’t, can’t, wouldn’t, couldn’t, or ought not to be the case, the
contextually relevant ideal ranks the relevant worlds according to how
F they are, and the p-worlds are F in some respects but not in others.
This hypothesis strikes me as plausible in examples (4)–(9) of §2.
Many different kinds of factors may be relevant to whether the
Confederates ought to be returned, consent should be granted, some
arbitrary event would happen, a free offer will be effective, Argentina
can beat Uruguay, and a lightsaber can cut through Superman.
I have not said what dimensions are or how they are structured—
for example, whether a dimension requires a precise cardinal scale of
degrees. Nor have I tried to identify the dimensions associated with
different kinds of modals, to explain how dimensions combine to
form a multidimensional ideal, or to settle whether such ideals are
to be understood in terms of Kratzerian ordering sources. I wish to
remain neutral on such questions.
If my hypothesis in this section is correct, then it is clear how there
can be reasons to f and reasons not to f on my account of normative
reasons. There can be such reasons only when and because whether we
ought to f depends on many different dimensions of an ideal. Some
of these dimensions may favour fing, while others oppose fing. I find
it hard to see how there could be such reasons if there were no respect
in which fing and not-fing were each, in some way, worth doing.
This story is distinct from the appeal to shifting ordering sources
considered in §3.2. I am not claiming that, whenever there are reasons
why we ought to f and reasons why we ought not to f, ‘We ought to
f’ and ‘We ought not to f’ both express truths, with their respective
oughts interpreted in different ways to isolate different dimensions.
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I am claiming instead that there can be such reasons even if neither
‘We ought to f’ nor ‘We ought not to f’ is true. There can be such
reasons because reason why p need not be factive with respect to p,
when p contains a multidimensional expression such as ought. This
does not require the semantic value of ought to shift in the sentences at
issue. (Nor, of course, does it rule out such a shift in other contexts.)
Let me conclude this section by briefly considering an objection.10
The view I have just sketched might seem too restrictive. For there
might seem to be cases in which we have reasons to f and reasons not
to f, without there being multiple dimensions relevant to whether or
not we ought to f. Suppose, for example, that we have only two
options: fing and cing. fing would relieve Ann’s physical pain,
and cing would relieve Bob’s physical pain; they would have no
other effects. We have a reason to f—namely, that it would relieve
Ann’s physical pain—and a reason to c—namely, that it would relieve
Bob’s physical pain—but there might seem to be only one dimension
relevant to whether we ought to f or c: namely, the relief of physical
pain. If that is right, then there can be reasons to f and reasons not to
f even if the relevant ideal is unidimensional.
But there are, I think, multiple dimensions relevant to the case just
described: there are the effects on Ann, and there are the effects on
Bob. If we treat each person’s good as a different dimension of the
relevant ideal, we can accommodate the case above. We have a reason
to f and a reason to c because fing is good in one way (namely, for
Ann), and cing is good in another way (namely, for Bob).
This does not mean that the only dimensions ever relevant to what
we ought to do are the effects on each person. The dimensions might
be even more fine-grained so that, for example, they reflect different
components of each person’s well-being. So, for instance, we might
have a reason to f because fing would be better for someone in some
respect—for example, by decreasing the intensity or duration of some
physical pain—even if fing would be worse for her (and everyone
else) all things considered. And, depending on our normative theory,
some dimensions might not be reducible to the good of any person at
all (for example, inequality, on some egalitarian views). With a suffi-
ciently fine-grained—and perhaps context-dependent (see Sassoon
2013)—partition of dimensions, we can answer the objection, so
10 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this objection.
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long as any source of reasons to f can be identified with a dimension
along which fing is worth doing.11
5. Conclusion
I have defended the view that a reason for someone to do something is
a reason why she ought to do it. This view is attractive in its unifica-
tion of normative and explanatory senses of the count-noun reason.
But it has seemed incompatible with the existence of pro tanto reasons.
The problem stems from the assumption that reason why p is always
factive with respect to p.
I have made three main claims in response to this problem.
I claimed, first, that there can be reasons why we ought to f
and reasons why we ought not to f; second, that this is not best
explained by attenuated or differentiated oughts; and third, that
there can be such reasons when and because the relevant ideal is
multidimensional.
If I am right that reason why is not factive, then why have so many
philosophers thought otherwise? Here is a guess: they have assumed
that a reason why p must be a fact that (at least partially) explains why
p, or plays some role in explaining why p—in short, that explanatory
reasons are (at least partial) explanations. And explanation does seem
factive: q (even just partially) explains why p only if p is true. If ex-
planation is indeed factive but explanatory reasons are not, then these
philosophers have been wrong to assume that explanatory reasons just
are explanations.12 For there can be reasons why p even if p is not the
kind of thing—a fact—that can be explained.13
11 The objector might worry that such a fine-grained conception of dimensions would make
my view too permissive. But my appeal to multidimensionality was motivated by examples
involving uncontroversially unidimensional adjectives, such as tall, long, and heavy. A fine-
grained partition of deontic ideals into many dimensions need not force us to recognize
multiple respects in which things can be tall, long, or heavy.
12 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for noticing how my arguments challenge this
assumption. Interestingly, Wilson (1979, p. 273) introduces the reason why construction as a
way of expressing a ‘potential partial explainer’, which—unlike an actual explanation—does
not presuppose the truth of what it might potentially explain. So there is precedent for dis-
tinguishing reasons why from explanations.
13 Thanks to Michael Deigan, Peter van Elswyk, Stephen Finlay, Ben Holguı´n, Jim Pryor, an
anonymous referee, and the editors for helpful comments.
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